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Introduction 
In the first age of rapid economic growth after 1945, fluctuations in western 
European output and employment were  so  mild that the very  notion of a 
"cyele" was transformed or even seemed obsolete. A second period of much 
slower average economic growth was marked by large and frequent oscillations, 
associated with the "oil shocks" and the Great Inflation ofthe 1970s and early 
1980s. A third phase, characterized by smooth and modest swings in output 
and inflation which lasted until2007, has been dubbed the "Great Moderation," 
reflecting the gradual reduction of inflationary trends. 
Different reasons have been proposed for these changing patterns, but a 
common factor is  that the conduct of economic policy was  critical.  In this 
chapter we explain how governments contributed and responded to fluctua-
tions in economic activity in Europe during the second half of the twentieth 
century.  In the second section we  sketch the basic ideas essential to under-
standing the relationship between economic policy and business cyeles. They 
in elude the notion that monetary and fiscal  policies influence fluctuations in 
output, employment, and inflation according to the financial openness of the 
economy (free capital flows  versus capital controls), as  well  as  the currency 
regime  chosen  by  policy  makers  (pegged  versus  flexible  exchange  rates). 
We also  document the timing of financial  liberalization in  Europe and the 
persistent preference of  most European governments for pegged exchange rate 
regimes over the entire periodo We then examine the evolution ofbasic features 
of cyeles in Europe, such as volatility and synchronization. We note the falling 
volatility of cyeles in the 1960s and from the mid-1980s until2007, explaining 
why changes in economic policy making were a fundamental driver. In the next 
section we  support this analysis with narratives of the responses of national 
governments and central bankers to cyelical fluctuations before and after the 
global recession of 1974-5. Finally we look briefly at the historical and recent 
experience of  eastern Europe, assessing the area's reintegration from 1989 after 
the long economic decoupling from the rest ofthe continent in 1945. 
A  conceptual framework 
Policy objectives 
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Governments' preferences determine whether stable purchasing power of the 
currency or a high and stable level of  production and employment will be their 
main policy focus.  They assign different weights to fluctuations in the level of 
prices and economic activity when taking policy decisions. 362  Stefano Battilossi, James Foreman-Peck, and Gerhard 
Historically, policy preferences reflected a broader societal consensus about 
the desirability of  alternative objectives. The great slump that began in 1929 was 
the catalyst for acceptance ofKeynesian economic doctrine, and more gene rally 
a belief in the obligation of  governments to prevent such a crisis from recurring. 
In most of the post-war industrialized world, government activism was legiti-
mated,  and heightened expectations of welfare  turned the pursuit of social 
reforms and full employment into the major objective of  economic policy. This 
approach has been blamed for  creating a persistent inflationary bias, which 
judged large fluctuations in the price level as  only a minor evil  (Burns 1979; 
Ciocca and Nardozzi 1996). A notable exception was West Germany, where the 
public reaction to earlier twentieth-century economic history was  an abhor-
rence of  inflation and an independent central bank committed to price stability. 
Onlyafter 1980 did a growing consensus about the undesirability of high and 
volatile inflation eventually change the macroeconomic regime, so that "taking 
on inflation" became the main priority of economic policy making (Volcker 
and Gyohten 1992). In the course ofthis regime shift, West German monetary 
arrangements became the model for  European transnational money in the 
European System Central Banks set up by the 1991 Maastricht Treaty. 
Policy instruments and  optimization 
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Monetary and fiscal policies are the two principal means of stabilizing prices, 
output, and employrnent.  During the  1950s  and  1960s,  the classic  instru-
ments of monetary policy - discount rate  (Bank Rate),  open market opera-
tions, and reserve requirements - were used in different combinations across 
western European countries; their mix also  changed over time in the same 
country. 
For example, Bank Rate was systematically employed by monetary author-
ities in the UK,  West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden. The 
French authorities also resorted frequently to this instrument in the 1950s, but 
much les s frequently in the following decade. Conversely, the Italian authorities 
left discount rates almost unchanged for very long periods (Michaely 1971, 
pp. 33-7). Both French and Italian authorities gave increasing priority to the 
maintenance of low and stable nominal interest rates, in order to guarantee 
cheap funding for the government and the large state-owned industrial sector. 
In many countries traditional instruments were complemented by a wide 
array of administrative control  s, such as cash and liquidity ratios, quantitative 
limits on rediscounting and credit, regulation of banks' external position, and 
so on. This diversity of instruments was maintained in the transition to target-
ing the growth rates of  the money stock for anti-inflationary purposes, initiated How the 
1945-2007 
byWest Germany around 1974 (von Hagen 1999, pp. 421-36) and adopted by 
the other major European governments by the end of the decade  (Houben 
2000, pp. 142-74). 
After  the  Second  W  orld  War the  enhanced  size  of the  typical  central 
government budget gave  the  state greater direct influence over the level  of 
spending in the economy. Total spending or aggregate demand determined the 
short-term demand for workers and the pressure on prices.  Countercyclical 
use of taxation and government spending therefore seemed to sorne a way of 
eliminating periodic slumps in employment. In practice the delays inherent in 
approving and planning new public expenditure, coupled with political pres-
sures not to cut spending, meant that fiscal policy was insufficiently responsive 
to be used for "fine tuning" econornic policy. Indeed there is evidence that in 
many cases fiscal stances were the principal destabilizing force in the economy; 
government spending and taxing policies were the sources of fluctuations in 
employment and output (Darvasz, Rose, and Szapary 2005). 
According to  the theory of macroeconomic  policy,  governments  should 
choose policy instruments so  as to optimize policy targets, and there is sorne 
evidence that this is what they tried to do. Macroeconomic policy coordination, 
in its earliest theoretical formulation,  suggested that different policy instru-
ments should be assigned to the various targets. In this way demand manage-
ment would be more effective, particularly when the value of  one target, such as 
unemployment, required expansion and another, such as the balance of pay-
ments, warranted contraction. Modern reformulations in game-theoretic fash-
ion also contend that fiscal and monetary authorities can achieve higher growth 
and price stability if they choose cooperative strategies (Nordhaus 1994). 
By  the  1990s,  there was  something of a reversion  to  nineteenth-century 
idealized gold standard policy that gave  less  scope to policy discretion.  The 
success of West German macroeconomic management encouraged the adop-
tion of policy rules that constrained European governments' options in mon-
etary and fiscal  policy. The Maastricht criteria and the Stability and Growth 
Pact were the most obvious examples. Governments were not competent, or 
could not be trusted, to exercise macroeconomic policy discretion, or it simply 
did not work. 
worked 
The  relationship  between  policy  instruments  and  targets  depends  on  the 
structure of the economy, which in our period was not fixed.  Opinions as to 
the relationship changed substantially in sorne countries over the sixty years 
from 1945. Partly in consequence, direct control  s and quantitative restrictions were more widely employed in the early period, while a greater willingness to 
use prices and work with markets is apparent in later years. 
Among structural factors,  financial openness and currency regimes deter-
mined whether and to what extent economic policy instruments could achieve 
their  targets.  There  is  a  close  relationship  between  the  possibilities  of an 
independent monetary policy geared towards domes  tic goals, pegged exchange 
rates, and international capital mobility for small open economies. A govern-
ment with a pegged exchange rate aims to counteract a recession by an expan-
sionary  monetary policy  that  initially  lowers  domestic  interest  rates.  The 
interest rate differential opened up with foreign capital markets causes a capital 
flight. Investors convert domestic currency into foreign currency at the pegged 
exchange rate, and the country's international reserves fall as the central bank is 
obliged to intervene in foreign exchange markets (i.e., buys domestic currency 
and sells foreign)  in order to stabilize the nominal exchange rate around the 
official pego This foreign exchange operation contracts the monetary stock and 
offsets the initial expansion: the domes  tic monetary stock is endogenous to the 
economy and cannot be controlled by the monetary authorities, so that output 
and employment ultimately remain unaffected. 
Attempts  to  "sterilize"  this  monetary offset  with  a  new expansion  of 
domestic  monetary  base  will  only  accelerate  the  drain  on  reserves. 
Exchange and capital controls may block or slow the outflow, but otherwise 
foreign exchange reserves will eventually be exhausted. Before that happens 
investors will anticipate the abandonment of the pegged exchange rate and 
there will be a "speculative attack." Fundamentals are inconsistent with the 
target exchange rate: policy-makers face a "trilemma" (Obstfeld, Shambaugh, 
and Taylor 2005) that obliges them, in the absence of capital controls, either 
to  abandon monetary expansion and keep  the pegged rate,  or to adopt a 
floating rate if they continue their inflationary policy. Policy makers wanting 
to  use tight monetary policy to  preserve price stability in an international 
inflationary environment will be equally frustrated by the expansionary effect 
of capital inflows and the accumulation of foreign reserves. In both cases, a 
weak form  of monetary policy independence could be  achieved  through 
periodical realignments  (i.e.,  devaluations or revaluations)  of the nominal 
exchange rate, validating the accumulated inflation differential. 
This  conceptual  framework  helps  explain  post-war  economic  policy  in 
western  Europe.  As  shown  in  Table  14.1,  over  the  second  half of the 
century European governments exhibited remarkably consistent preferences 
for  pegged  exchange  rates  and  a  clear  dislike  of floating.  Their  choice 
reflected  the  harm  that  they  believed  exchange  rate  fluctuations  would 
have caused to  intra-European trade and the Common Agricultural  Policy 
(Eichengreen  1996b,  p.  137). Business  1945-2007 
Table 14.1  Currency regime of sixteen western  European  countries,  1950-2007 
1954-5 
100.0  1950  1951-71,  1999-
1978-98 
Fínland  71.9  195()-.-1,  1973~92,  1999-
1967-73  1993-8 
Franca  89.5  1956-71  1971-3.  1999-
1974-98 
Germany  47.4  1954-71,  1999-
1972 
Gresca  96.5  1950-81  198H8  1999-
Ireland  100.0  197IHJlI  :1999-
ltaly  ~.O  1951-]3:  1983~,  1·999-
1993'-8 
Netherlands  100.0  19!ID-71  1971~8  1999-
Norway  0.0 
Portugal  87.7  195()-.-1973  1981-98  1999-
Spain  100.0  1951~  1981-98  1999-
Swec!en  71.9  1951-73  1973-92 
Switzerland  70.2  1950-73  1981-88 
UK  43.9  1950-72  1991-2 
Notes: Definition based on de tacto classification by Reinhardt and Rogoff (2004) and related 
background material. Pegs include: pre-announced peg or currency board, pre-announced band 
narrower than or equal to +/-2%, de facto peg, pre-announced and de facto crawling peg, and 
crawling band narrower than or equal to +/-2 percent. 
Pegging to the US  Dollar under the Bretton W oods System was definitely 
abandoned by most European governments in 1972-3, but quickly replaced 
by de  facto  pegging to  the Deutschmark.  Two  periods of anchoring to  the 
German currency as an external constraint on domestic economic policy were 
the  "Snake"  (1972-8)  and the European Monetary System  (1979-93).  Both 
initially  proved  sustainable  only  for  a  group  of northern  European  small 
economies with moderate inflation. But the peg was successfully adopted by 
large inflationary countries in the early 1980s as a disciplinary device to achieve 
disinflation (Gros and Thygesen 1992). 
Capital mobility and arbitrage also increased over the period, both beca use of 
official financialliberalization and by circumvention of national capital con-
trols (Marston 1995). As shown in Table 14.2, based on an index of external 
financial deregulation (Quinn 2003), European governments gradually relaxed Stefano Battilossi, James Foreman-Peck, and Gerhard Kling 
Table 14.2  Qui nn  i  ndex of capital  liberalization, 1950-2000 
1950400  1960..l7:0  191'!1)4,80  1980.¡,9Q  1991)4,2000  'lear of full  ilremparal'Y! 
IIberall,zation  <lQn1~1ilí  after 
lillieralization 
Austria  12.5  62.5  62.5  75  81'!.5 
8elgium  75  1'!5  75  75  100  1990  1996-8 
Denmark  31'!.5  1'!5  75  1'!5  100  1988 
Finland  12.5  12.5  50  50  100  1994 
France  62.5  1'!5  75  75  81'!.5  1998 
Germany  1'!5  100  100  100  100  1957  1973, 
197'8-80 
Greeca  25  50  50  50  75  1997 
Ireland  50  50  75  75  100  1992 
ltaly  37.5  75  75  75  100  1988  1990-2 
Netherlands  1'!5  75  75  100  100  1983 
Norway  37.5  37.5  31'!.5  62.5  100  1990 
Portugal  25  25  37.5  37.5  87.5 
Spain  12.5  50  50  1'!5  1'!5  1999 
SWeden  12.5  62.5  62.5  75  81'!.5 
SWitzerland  100  100  100  100  100  1950  1964405, 
1974-8 
UK  50  50  50  100  100  1979 
Note: Index of liberalization of capital account transactions. Scoring ranges from O (full restriction) to 100 (full 
liberalization). See details in Quinn 2003. Reported values are median score by decades. 
capital controls fram the late 1970s and eventually dismantled them during the 
1980s, enhancing the prominence of the "trilemma." 
From the mid-1950s to 1971, and again from the early 1980s to the adoption 
of the single  currency in  1998,  pegged  currency regimes  limited the policy 
discretion of governments.  Pegged rates  restricted how much inflation was 
possible without capital flight and a change in the exchange rate. They thereby 
contributed to holding down both expected and actual inflation. 
In the last quarter of the twentieth century financial integration further tied 
the hands of governments. Only during the fifteen years between the demise of 
Bretton W oods and the last realignment within the EMS (1987) did floating or 
pegged-but-frequently-adjusted rates  relax  this  external constraint and give 
policy makers significant leeway.  As  we  show in the following  section,  this 
was  also the period in which fiscal  and monetary policies became less  disci-
plined and business cycles  in Europe more volatile.  Government policy was 
more active and public uncertainty increased as to future inflation. 
This uncertainty is  demonstrated by the history of the Phillips curve,  an 
empirical relation between inflation and unemployrnent. Originally estimated 
for  the  UK  fram  1861  to  1957,  the  data spanned a  period of stable  price 1945-2007 
expectations.  Once  figures  from  more  inflationary  subsequent  years  were 
introduced,  the  simplicity of the  inverse  relationship  disappeared.  It could 
only be  recovered  by  introducing  changing  expected  inflation  (as  well  as 
determinants  of shifts  in  the  underlying  equilibrium  unemployrnent  rate). 
Any idea that policy makers could trade off more inflation against less unem-
ployrnent disappeared along with the basic Philips curve. For if policy makers 
chose  any  unemployment  rate  aboye  the  equilibrium  rate,  rising  inflation 
quickly shifted the apparent trade-offby raising price expectations. 
The Phillips curve has subsequently been interpreted as an aggregate supply 
curve.  The apparent trade-off reflects aggregate demand fluctuations along a 
short-run supply curve. In the long run, with price expectations consistent with 
actual inflation, the supply curve is vertical at the equilibrium unemployrnent. 
Demand management cannot influence this level of unemployrnent. Markets 
have  rational expectations and cannot be  fooled  by governments or central 
banks.  This  explains  why expansionary demand management in the  1970s 
boosted inflation but not employrnent. 
1ecessions 
Whether or not policy stabilized or destabilized in practice, European econo-
mies were repeatedly struck by shocks, usually adverse, and oscillated accord-
ingly.  There are various ways of identifying these cycles. The widely adopted 
definition of the National Bureau of Economic Research  (NBER)  states that 
recessions are characterized by "a significant decline in activity, spread across 
the economy, lasting more than a few months, visible in industrial production, 
employrnent,  real  income,  and  trade."  Peaks  and  troughs  of output  and 
employment mark the turning points of  cycles; expansions - that is, the move-
ment from trough to peak - represent the normal state of the economy, while 
recessions are "brief and relatively rare." In the post-war European experience 
they were so indeed. 
Figure  14.1  shows  two  alternative  indicators  of  fluctuations.  Recent 
approaches  define  cycles  in terms of deviations  of output from  underlying 
secular growth trends (Hodrick and Prescott 1997; Backus and Kehoe 1992). 
Extracting the cycle requires therefore detrending the (log)  GDP series. This 
can be carried out either by assuming a linear trend and first-differencing the 
series, thus obtaining annual growth rates, or by applying a filter that removes 
a non-linear trend from  the series.  The trend is  meant to  capture potential 
output, and deviations from trend are interpreted as output gaps. Stefano Battilossi, James Foreman-Peck,  and Gerhard 
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Figure 14.1  The European eyele, 1950-2007. 
Weighted  real  GDP of sixteen  European eountries (weights are eaeh eountry's share); 
in eludes Austria,  Belgium,  Denmark, Finland, Franee, West Germany (unified Germany after 
1990),  Greeee,  Ireland,  Italy, Netherlands, Norway,  Portugal,  Spain, Sweden,  Switzerland, 
UK.  GDP is expressed in 1990 international $.  Growth rate is year-to-year ehange in log 
(GDP).  Cyeles (output gap)  are deviations from trend  obtained by Hodriek-Preseott filtering 
with smoothing parameter 6.5. Sources: Data from the Conferenee Board and Groningen 
Growth and  Development Center, Total Eeonomy Database. 
Level  of output data and growth rates  suggest that western Europe went 
through just three major episodes that can be classified as  generalized reces-
sions. The first two episodes were not exclusively European, but rather com-
mon shocks to industrialized economies: the extraordinary jump in the price of 
oil and food in 1974-5, and the second oil shock and the "austerity policies" 
implemented to keep their inflationary consequences under control in 1980-2. 
The third episode  (1992-3) was  more European in  nature, for  shocks were 
mainly related to German reunification, the ensuing unusually tight monetary 
policies and the crisis of the European Monetary System, although the crisis 
partially overlapped with the US recession of 1990-l. 
However dampened the cycle  was  for  western Europe as  a whole  before 
1973-4,  episodes  of stagnation  or even  recession  were  far  from  absent  at 
nationallevel, as  shown in Table  14.3.  Country-specific recessions were rare 
between  1958  and  1974-5,  but  reappeared  from  the  late  1970s  until  the 
early 1990s, reflecting the increased frequency of idiosyncratic shocks. These 1945-2007 
Table 14.3  European  recessions,  1950-2007: a  synopsis 
Notes: Recessions are indicated by years with annual real GDP growth either negative or in the range 
between O and 0.5. 
Source: Total Economy Database. 
shocks  were  often  related  to  financial  liberalization  and  the  constraint 
imposed by  rigidly  pegged  currency  regimes.  The  most  dramatic  example 
was  the deep crisis  that hit the Nordic economies  (Sweden  and Finland in 
particular)  in  1990-3,  the  severest  for  those  countries  since  the  Great 
Depression  (Jonung,  Schicknecht, and Tujula 2005). 
The  Nordic  crisis  was  a  particularly  painful  variation  of a  new  type  of 
economic  fluctuation  that  emerged  in  Europe  in  the  1980s.  According  to 
this interpretation, successful disinflation, falling interest rates, and the liberali-
zation of traditionally highly regulated banking and financial systems favored 
the  excessive  accumulation  of debt,  generating  long  boom cycles  of credit 
and asset prices (Borio 2003). At the peak of the cycle, mounting inflationary 
pressures  became  incompatible  with  pegged  exchange  rates,  and  triggered 
contractionary intervention of monetary authorities,  turning the boom into 
bust. Jaeger and Schuknecht (2004) identified sixteen episodes of asset prices 
boom and thirteen ofbust in western Europe after 1984. Stefano BaHilossi, James Foreman-Peck, and Gerhard 
Ironically the business cycle was declared obsolete in the industrialized econo-
mies at the end of  the 1960s, just when it was about to resume. The shocks of  the 
1970s caused a jump in cyclical volatility. There is now a broad consensus that 
not only supply-side  shocks  (oil  prices),  but also  governments'  pro-active 
response based on Keynesian demand management, fueled inflation and fur-
ther destabilized fluctuations. From the mid-1980s until2007, most industrial-
ized countries dramatically shifted to low volatility, entering an era of "Great 
Moderation" in which cycles  were  barely perceptible,  or at least attenuated 
(Blanchard  and Simon  2001;  Stock and Watson 2004).  Figure  14.2  clearIy 
suggests  parallel  stories  for  western  Europe  and the  United States.  By  the 
1990s  output gap  volatility reached historically low values  in aH  European 
economies, as illustrated in Table 14.4. 
It is well established that the duration of cycles lengthened and their ampli-
tude (height of troughs and peaks) diminished during this period, which has 
now of course ended (Borio 2003, pp. 6-7). Why did cycles stabilize over the 
twenty years after the mid-1980s? And what has this period in common with 
the previous stabilization of the 1960s? 
In the 1960s,  the absence of the cyclical swings of the interwar years  was 
often attributed to the greater role  of government in the  economy through 
ownership of swathes  of industry,  supplemented by budgets  of historically 
unprecedented size.  Heavier taxation and greater transfers, as  weH  as  bigger 
state bureaucracies, meant that a large component of aggregate demand was 
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Figure 14.2  Transatlantic Great Moderation. Time-varying volatility of output gap. Values for 
each  year are  calculated as a  ten-year rolling window ending in that year. Business cycles and economic policy, 1945-2007 
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Figure 14.3  Inflation and output gap volatility, 1950-2007. Inflation volatility: standard 
deviation of consumer price index annual inflation  in sixteen western  European  countries in 
the periods 1950-73; 1974-93; 1994-2007. Output gap volatility:  standard deviation of 
output gap in the same periods. $ource:  ePI indices from  IMF,  International Financial 
Statistics.  Real  GDP from Total  Economy Database. Stelano Battilossi, James Foreman-Peck, and Gerhard 
les s exposed to the vagaries of  the market than in classic laissez-faire capitalism. 
Anglocentric interpretations of history were inclined to attribute this greater 
stability and high levels of  employment to the Keynesian demand management 
ofbenign and omniscient governments (Boltho 1982). But even in what should 
have been the most Keynesian of economies, in Britain where the doctrine 
originated, the cause of the higher levels of employrnent in these decades was 
primarily higher investment, and secondarily higher exports, rather than public 
sector deficits  (Matthews 1968).  Policy was  not Keynesian  in  the sense that 
fiscal policy targeted employment creation (Tomlinson 1984). Close observers 
noted that, while the larger government sector may have contributed to strong 
private sector demand by enhancing confidence, it was also government that 
triggered recessions with demand management (Maddison 1960). 
Contrary to  the Keynesian  interpretation, even  the most conservative of 
national economic policies met with apparently similar or greater success in 
minimizing the business cycle.  Ludwig  Erhard's economic miracle in West 
Germany, based on currency reform  and price decontrol,  and António de 
Oliveira Salazar's balanced budgets  in Portugal, are cases  in  point. Growth 
was strong and prices stable also in Italy during the 1950s, where the Governor 
of the  Bank of Italy,  Donato  Menichella,  targeted  the  exchange  rate  and 
contended  that  unemployment  was  a  structural  problem,  not  one  to  be 
addressed by demand management (Fratianni and Spinelli 1997). 
Governments' ability to keep inflation low and stable, by reducing uncer-
tainty about future inflation, may have reduced output variability again after 
the 1980s. In turn this created a more favorable macroeconomic environment. 
Also  thanks to lower inflationary expectations, monetary policy was  able to 
respond more effectively  to shocks.  Consistent with this  view,  both in  the 
USA  and western Europe the steep drop in cycle volatility coincided with a 
clear anti-inflationary twist in the conduct of  monetary policy. In Europe there 
is  a robust positive empirical relationship between inflation and output gap 
variability, as shown in Figure 14.3. 
The wide geographical spread of the Great Moderation points to common 
causal factors:  anti-inflationary policies and successful macroeconomic coor-
dination through the EMS, together with the increased independence of  central 
banks, kept inflationary expectations low and stable. Constrained discretion 
and better coordination between monetary and fiscal policy may help explain 
the outstanding moderation of the British cycle since the 1990s,  in  spite of 
sustained economic growth (HM Treasury 2002). 
Or possibly  it  was  just good  luck;  that  is,  particularly  benign  economic 
conditions with only mild and infrequent adverse events (such as supply shocks). 
Stock and Watson (2004), for instance, find that the fall in G-7 countries' output 
variance  in  the  1980s  and  1990s  relative  to  the  1960s  and  1970s  is  almost 1945-2007 
completely explained by the decline in the magnitude of shocks. But, if oil price 
hikes were the main driver of GDP volatility, the shift to the moderation era 
should have been synchronized. The significant lags with which different coun-
tries stabilized suggest that the role  of the vanishing oil shocks in the Great 
Moderation is ambiguous at least (Surnmers 2005, pp. 15-20). 
Links  between the low inflation  and low volatility of Figure  14.3  may be 
more subtle. Since the 1980s the amplitude and persistence of asset price cycles 
have increased in westem Europe. The boom-and-bust fluctuations mentioned 
aboye have also been associated with large and persistent deviations of output 
growth from trend. This regularity is consistent with the financial system and the 
real economy becoming more closely associated, through household and corpo-
rate indebtedness, gross fixed investments, and asset prices. Sorne argue that this 
new environment is a retum to that of the gold standard (Goodhart 2003). 
Synchronization 
~~-
Along with a secular fall in volatility, European cycles after 1950 also beca me 
more synchronized. By the end of  the twentieth century a true "European" cycle 
seems to have emerged (see Figure 14.4). Why? 
Increased synchronization of cycles  across countries can be caused either 
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Figure 14.4  Increasing synchronization of main European cycles. Output gap based on (Iog) 
real  GDP. Source: as for Figure 14.1. Stefano Battilossi, James Foreman-Peck, and Gerhard 
mechanisms that transmit unanticipated events.  One possible mechanism is 
international integration and interdependence created by increasing trade in 
goods and financial assets (Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1993). But trade might 
also in  crease the probability of sector-specific, asymmetric shocks, which could 
reduce cycle correlation (Krugman 1993). 
Greater integration is  not strictIy necessary to explain closer cycle correla-
tion,  however.  For  any level  of integration,  cycles  may be  synchronized if 
common  shocks  become  stronger  or  more  frequent:  the  two  oil  shocks 
synchronized the recessions  of 1974-5 and 1981-2 and explain the greater 
correlation of  the 1970s and 1980s. But in the absence oflarge common shocks 
since  the  early  1990s,  the  causes  of subsequent  synchronization  must be 
different. 
Pegging exchange rates to the DM within the EMS may have enhanced cycle 
correlation through in  crea sed coordination of macroeconomic policies (Artis 
and Zhang 1997; Inklaar and de Haan 2001). SubsequentIy the EMU and the 
Growth and Stability Pact,  by  requiring  countries  to  follow  fiscal  rules  or 
disciplines,  might create  an  optimum currency area,  as  Darvasz,  Rose,  and 
Szapary (2005) contend. Or simply introducing such rules might trigger com-
mOn shocks and therefore a policy-induced cycle correlation. 
In any case, the increased synchronization of national fluctuations with the 
German cycle is  unquestionable. Table 14.5  shows that a limited number of 
European economies fluctuated with Germany before 1973. By the end of the 
century the German connection had become a salient feature of  most European 
cycles, with the important exception of the UK's, which was decoupled from 
continental  cycles  and  more  synchronized  with  North  America's  (Artis, 
Marcellino, and Proietti 2004; Duecker and Wesche 2004). 
narratives 
Coordination failures 
Under the Bretton W  oods System, a target for  both governments and central 
banks  was  to  maintain  the value  of pegged  exchange  rates,  but what  this 
required was not always well understood. Uncertainty about the time that the 
economy took to respond to policy measures compounded the challenge. 
As  noted aboye,  under the pegged exchange rate government policy was 
constrained by the external balance. Therefore economic policy should have 
responded to fluctuations in the exchange rate, international reserves, and the 
current account. Yet  statistical evidence suggests  demand management was Business  1945-2007 
Table 14.5  Increasing  German  dominance? 
Synchrl:>nizaUl:>n I:>f !Wcles with Germany 
1950".13  1974-93  1994'-2007 
Switzerland  0.06  0.56  0.90 
ltaly  0.16  0.81  0.87 
Netherlands  0.13  0.87  0.81 
Austria  0.79  0.66  0.82 
France  0.57  0.67  0.79 
Belgium  0.49  0.63  0.78 
Spain  -0.20  0.32  0.75 
Denmark  0.44  0.58  0.70 
Sweden  0.36  0.28  0.69 
Finland  0.39  0.13  .65 
Portugal  0.00  0.55  0.62 
UK  0.21  0.35  '0;60 
Ireland  0.15  0',31 
.  '0;55 
Norway  -0.04  0.35  0.17 
Greece  -0.16  0.64  0.06 
mean  0.22  0.52  0.65 
variance  0.08  .  0.04  0.06 
Note: Based on correlation (Pearson) of output gaps. 
unresponsive to external imbalanees in the vast majority ofEuropean countries. 
Aecording to the most detailed study available for  nine western eeonomies 
between 1950 and 1966 (Miehaely 1971), no consistent pattern of response by 
budgetary policies, as an instrument of  aggregate demand poliey, to the balance 
of  payments can be found. 
Even more strikingly, sueh unresponsiveness apparently eannot be explained 
by the use  of the budget for  eompeting poliey targets.  Rather, fiscal  poliey 
seemed  unavailable  for  the  correction  of domes  tic,  as  well  as  balanee-of-
payments, disequilibria. Governments apparently did not combine fiscal  and 
monetary policy in a manner consistent with the "poliey mix" rule.  Tighter 
monetary poliey was appropriate to correcting a balance of payments deficit, 
for  higher interest rates  would draw in mobile capital.  Expansionary fiscal 
poliey,  aeeording to the Keynesian economic doctrine of the day in Britain 
and the USA,  would address rising unemployment. With hindsight, govern-
ments probably did not use the policy mix rule simply beeause it would not 
have worked in most cireumstanees. More likely, the long run level of unem-
ployment was determined by the structure of  the labor market and the extent of 
eompetition between firms. Attempts to reduce unemployment below this level 
using demand poliey would have been met with rising inflation. Then, as poliey 
switehed to bringing down inflation, unemployment would have begun rising. Stefano BaHilossi, James Foreman-Peck, and Gerhard 
Coordination  between  domestic  monetary and fiscal  policy  could  be  a 
challenge,  particularly  with  a  formally  independent  central  bank,  for  the 
central bank might object to financing government budget deficits by mone-
tary expansiono It might prefer to rein in demand in order to stop price rises if 
the government budget was too inflationary. The German Bundesbank (until 
1957 Bank Deutscher Uinder) often resisted the expansionary fiscal policies of 
the West German Federal Government. A 1948 law imposed on the German 
central bank the primary task of "safeguarding the currency." From 1951  the 
Bank was also  required to support the government's economic policy when 
there was no conflict with the currency objective. Economic performance was 
unlikely simply to have been a consequence of the accident of central bank 
independence; among other influences the intellectual climate created by the 
Freiburg School  of Walter Eucken,  which emphasized proactive policies  to 
support and enhance competition - a supply orientated neo-liberalism - must 
have played a role (Denton, Forsyth, and Maclennan 1968). 
History was perhaps even more important, as the following episode shows. 
In mid-1955 the West German central bank raised interest rates, after a long 
period of monetary ease,  and publicly criticized the expansionary stance of 
Federal fiscal policy (Berger and de Haan 1999). The government was planning 
increased spending to improve its standing in the 1957 election, and therefore 
used its temporary veto over the next interest rate rise in March 1956. However, 
influential  members  of the  government,  Economics  Minister  Erhard  and 
Finance Minister Schaffer, supported the bank policy against Adenauer, the 
Chancellor, in order to maintain price stability. These ministers also sat on the 
central bank'  s board and voted for yet another interest rate increase in May 
1956. Together with the bank, they were publicly denounced by the Chancellor. 
But public opinion was  against Adenauer and he was  obliged to back down. 
More expansionary fiscal  policy would not be  accommodated by monetary 
policy, and therefore it was less likely to reduce unemployment sufficiently to 
boost re-election chances. 
A similar conflict emerged ten years  latero  From 1964  strong expansion, 
driven by domestic demand, was compounded by sustained wage growth that 
was faster than the rise in productivity. Inflationary pressures were greater than 
at any time since the Korean War boom. The Federal government's budget 
deficit increased and the current account deteriorated. Again a strong correc-
tion was imposed by the Bundesbank through discount rate hikes between 1965 
and 1966, against the protests ofCabinet members. The 1967 "mini-recession"-
the first episode of  negative growth experienced by West Germany since 1945 -
was the result (Holtfrerich 1999, pp. 378-80). 
Recent interpretations regard the Bundesbank's switching from tolerance of 
inflation in 1961-4 to a restrictive stance in 1965-6, in conflict with the Federal Business cycles and economic policy, 1945-2007 
government, as a new episode of  institutional rivalry. Marsh (1992, pp. 186-8) 
and Leaman (2001,  pp.  138-42) underline the opportunistic behavior of the 
German central bank. According to this view, pre-eminence given to inflation-
fighting should be evaluated against a broader political context, and could be 
interpreted  as  an attempt  to  absolve  the  central  bank from  government's 
responsibility for rising inflation, as well as a decisive step in the Bundesbank's 
ascent to political and economic dominance. 
Formal or legal central bank independence may have mattered less for policy 
than the brief or target assigned to the institution or their ignorance of policy 
impacts. This is suggested by the conflict between the Governor of  the Bank of 
England and British Chancellor of the Exchequer (Finance Minister), Peter 
Thorneycroft in 1957. The Bank Rate was raised to 7 percent in September, as 
inflation triggered short-term capital movements that threatened the exchange 
rate (Cairncross 1996). Thorneycroft wanted to increase his range of  monetary 
instruments so  that interest rates need not rise  so  high,  adversely affecting 
industry and employment. He tried to persuade commercial banks to reduce 
their loans by 5 percent, but they refused, and the Governor would not issue the 
directive. 
Despite the nationalization of the Bank of England in 1946, Thorneycroft 
lacked the authority to coerce the banks or dismiss the Governor, as he would 
have liked.  Unemployrnent duly increased from  autumn 1957  to  a peak in 
November 1958. Reflationary measures, beginning in May 1958, were slow to 
take effect, but by the second half  of  1959 were creating excessive expansiono N o 
doubt this  helped the re-election of the Macmillan government in October 
1959. Removal of banking restrictions in the middle of 1958 almost doubled 
loans in the following three years. In addition there were tax concessions and 
greater public  spending  in  the  1959  budget.  Bank  Rate  was  reduced  from 
6 percent in March 1959 to 4 percent in November. These measures interacted 
with each other to produce an unexpectedly strong expansion in spending. The 
balance of payrnents began to cause concern as  imports soared, and the first 
experiments with incomes policy were discussed, to limit wage increases. The 
contrast with the German episode is more in the lack of  coordination between 
the deregulation of banking and other policies  than in lack of central bank 
independence. 
brakes and the external constraint 
During the 1960s, in a significant group ofEuropean countries, instruments of 
monetary policy - mainly the discount rate and the growth rate  of money 
supply - moved in a  direction  (though  not necessarily  with  a magnitude) Stefano Battilossi, James Foreman-Peck,  and Gerhard 
consistent with the  external  position.  That is,  interest  rates  increased  and 
growth of  the money supply fell during periods of  balance of payments deficit. 
This evidence is broadly compatible with monetary policy being flexible and 
effective, whereas fiscal policy was inflexible and inappropriate. 
The IMF view was  that countries  affected  by "temporary and reversible 
disequilibrium in the balance of payments ... should not be expected to incur 
fluctuations  in  internal  demand and activity."  Rather,  they  should pursue 
"policies aimed at attracting appropriate equilibrating movements of private 
capital through international coordination of interest rates." But coordinating 
such  policies  between  sovereign  governments was  a considerable challenge 
(Chalmers 1972). Pursuing domestic policies that maintained the confidence 
of internationally mobile capital turned out to be a surer bet. 
Domestic monetary policy might offset contractions triggered by the balance 
of  payments. When international reserves, a central bank asset partly balancing 
the liability of domestic money, fell without a change of policy, the domestic 
money stock would normally decline. However, policy could, and in the 1960s 
did,  counteract this effect  by increasing central bank holdings  of domestic 
assets  (government bonds and bills  in  particular)  made easier  by  copious 
government borrowing.  But the exchange  rate,  and the foreign  reserves  to 
support it,  were not protected by this  "sterilization" operation. Sterilization 
therefore meant more balance of payments crises, which could force exchange 
rate re-alignments. 
The  external  constraint was  binding on all  governments,  irrespective  of 
their ideology. In Franco's Spain, still operating under a semi-autarkic regime 
in the late 1950s, inflation was fueled by populist wage measures taken to stem 
political unrest and uncontrolled creation of liquidity by the Bank of Spain. 
This  led  in  1959  to  a  mounting  current  account  deficit  and  the  virtual 
exhaustion of reserves. Assisted by the IMF and the OECD, the regime agreed 
to devalue the peseta and implement an orthodox package of fiscal adjustment 
and monetary restriction (Carreras and Tafunell 2004b, pp. 325-35). In Italy 
three years later, inflationary pressures at a peak of the expansionary cycle, a 
current account deficit approaching 4 percent of GDP, and massive capital 
flights (also caused by untimely nationalization of electric utilities) decided the 
Bank of Italy  to  implement a  credit  squeeze.  Devaluation  of the  lira  was 
avoided at the cost of a sudden contraction of economic activity (De Cecco 
1969;  Fratianni and Spinelli  1997,  pp.  509-16). For those governments too 
timid to put on the brake when inflationary pressure accumulated, the only 
alternative in the end was  reluctantIy to accept exchange rate changes, as  in 
the  cases  of the  1967-9  devaluations  of the  pound and the  French  franc 
(Eichengreen  1996b,  pp.  125-8, 2007,  pp.  233-41; Patat and Lutfalla  1990, 
pp. 207-10). 1945-2007 
But  "stop"  policies  could  fail  too.  In  West  Germany  in  1970-1  the 
Bundesbank's attempt to curb domestic liquidity and control rising inflation 
by using restrictive  monetary and credit policies  was  swamped by massive 
inflows  of foreign  capital  attracted  by  high  interest  rates.  To  allow  the 
Bundesbank to regain  control of the  money supply,  floating  was  judged a 
more feasible  solution than an escalation of administrative  capital controls 
(Emminger 1977, p. 28; von Hagen 1999, pp. 404-19). 
Stop-go:  responding to unemployment 
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The recession  of the  mid-1970s  brought to  an end the post-war epoch  of 
stability:  "stagflation"  - rising  unemployment  and inflation  - marked  the 
next decade or more.  In fact  inflationary pressures,  powered by high wage 
demands from trade unions and sustained expansion of governments' expen-
ditures, had beco me evident in most European economies from 1970. But no 
longer was policy constrained by the pegged exchange rates of Bretton W oods, 
and attempts to control inflation with tight monetary policies in 1972-3 were 
soon abandoned. In the short run, both in the USA  and in western Europe 
fiscal and monetary policies accommodated the oil shock, interpreted as tran-
sitory  negative  shocks  to  aggregate  supply.  Increasing  budget  deficits  and 
government debt, fast  money growth, and low or even negative real interest 
rates dominated until the early 1980s. 
Proactive responsiveness to adverse shocks contributed to the creation of 
unusually large inflation differentials between European countries. One group, 
anchored to West Germany, switched earlier to price stability and learned 
coordination  between  fiscal  and  monetary policy  - not  without  conflicts 
between the two arms of government. The other, including Britain, France, 
and Italy, was reluctant to abandon full employment as its main policy objec-
tive, and preferred the expansion followed by contraction of"stop-go" policies, 
rather than acknowledge the constraint that international capital mobility and 
confidence placed on their choices. 
A policy innovation intended to  contain rising wages  and prices  was  to 
persuade unions and firms  to  limit these in  creases  to les s than a  specified 
annual percentage. These "corporatist" patterns of economic policy making, 
based on "the co-ordinated, co-operative, and systematic management of the 
national economy by the state,  centralized unions,  and employers"  (Siaroff 
1999), succeeded in containing inflation where it had developed into a basic 
feature of the "post-war settlement," as in Austria, Germany, or Scandinavia. 
Here governments'  commitment to  raising living  standards with economic 
growth  policies  and  planning  was  reciprocated  by  wage  restraint  in  the James Foreman-Peck, and Gerhard 
knowledge that such moderation would allow higher investment and therefore 
high future living standards (Eichengreen 1996a). But in countries with differ-
ent political traditions and institutional setup, the "post-war settlement" failed 
in the face  of mounting inflationary expectations. Prices and incomes policies 
in the UK, France, and Italy (in the two latter as part of indicative planning) 
were ineffective in controlling inflation for more than very short periods on 
those occasions when policies could be agreed (Ulman and Flanagan 1971). 
The classic  example  of a  Keynesian  policy  response  is  the  British  fiscal 
expansion of 1972-3. Following four disappointing years oflow growth, rising 
unemployment, and mounting cost inflation and now in the cycle trough, the 
British government increased spending and cut taxes significantly. The aban-
donment of external equilibrium as a policy objective was announced by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, who declared that "it is  neither necessary nor 
desirable to distort domestic economies to an unacceptable extent in order to 
retain unrealistic exchange rates" (James 1996, p. 239). Recovery of  growth and 
employment in  1972-3 was  therefore accompanied by a new bout of infla-
tionary pressures, the worst deterioration of the current account in the post-
war period, and a new external crisis forcing sterling out of the "Snake." 
In spite of the removal of the balance of payment constraint by floating the 
exchange rate, growth remained slow and both unemployment and inflation 
kept rising. The end of demand-Ied growth policies carne with the 1976 IMF 
crisis, when in order to obtain a loan to support the balance of payrnents, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer was obliged to write a Letter of Intent to pursue 
"sounder" economic policies. By then, Labor Prime Minister Callaghan recog-
nized that the option to "spend your way out of a recession" was no longer 
feasible (Budd 1998, pp. 275-6). 
On the Continent, however, this notion had yet to spread  .. French policy 
makers proved the most reluctant to abandon demand expansion policies. The 
anti-inflationary "Plan Fourcade" of 1974-5, launched after the first withdrawal 
from the Snake, soon gave way to an expansionary "Relance Chirac" leading to 
mounting budget and current account deficits, a new exit from the Snake, and 
the resignation of its proponent. The "austerity plan" of  the new prime minis-
ter, Rayrnond Barre, temporarily succeeded in achieving external balance and 
controlling the budget and inflation. But unemployrnent rose,  and even the 
gains that had been made were wiped out by the second oil shock and the 1980 
socialist victory in the presidential election. 
The newly elected government, facing a global downturn, embarked on a 
program  of nationalization  to  promote  investment  and  heavily  increased 
government spending. Under the "Plan Mauroy," the budget deficit reached 
3 percent of GDP, the continuous devaluation of the exchange rate failed to 
reduce the mounting current account deficit, and inflation remained around ¡.~¡j~~~~j~:;:,:  Business cycles and economic policy, 1945-2007 
10 percent. Within eighteen months capital flight forced a reversal of policy. A 
stable  exchange  rate  could  not be  maintained with  such  fiscal  expansiono 
Between  1983  and 1986  a  new "austerity plan,"  under the management of 
Jacques Delors, eventually achieved disinflation, although unemployrnent had 
reached 2.4 million at the end of 1984, four times greater than ten years earlier 
(Estrin and Holmes 1983; Patat and Lutfalla 1990, p. 232). 
These overambitious aggregate demand policies  were  driven not only by 
mistaken economics but also  by political party competition for  the votes of 
electorates.  Hence  it  is  reasonable  to  wonder  to  what  extent  the  political 
orientation  of western  European  governments  influenced  their  economic 
policies. 
Parties want to be re-elected, but they may also have ideological commit-
ments that appeal to only a section of  the electorate. Debtors might be inc1ined 
to vote for left-wing parties and creditors for right-wing representatives, on the 
grounds that left-wing parties are expansionary and inflationary while right-
wing parties pursue contractionary policies in the interests of price stability. 
Supposing this to be so, and bearing in mind that the outcomes of  elections are 
often uncertain, when a left-wing government wins an election average expect-
ations of inflation over the next year or two are likely to be lower than felt 
desirable by the new government, in so far as there was sorne chance that a low-
inflation  right-wing government could  have  been  elected.  Inflation  expect-
ations before an election are based on averaging the policies of the possible 
governments  and weighting by the likelihood of their election.  So  long  as 
inflation expectations are lower than actual inflation, real wages will be reduced 
and labor demand will  expando  Eventually expectations will  catch up  with 
reality and the cyc1e upswing will stop. The converse is the case for the election 
of  a right-wing government in this "rational partisan theory" (RPT) ofbusiness 
cyc1es. 
The case of  the French socialists is consistent with RPT. In a period of  world 
recession (1981-3), the Mitterrand government at first pursued expansionary 
policies,  keeping French economic growth positive while many other major 
industrial economies were in recession (Alesina 1989). The Swedish conserva-
tives (1976) also offer a particularly good fit to the theory. In Sweden, output 
growth fell strongly from 1975-6 to 1978, consistent with inflation expectations 
being aboye the government's target. 
on inflation 
The  1980s  saw  increasing  acceptance  of conservative  macroeconomics  by 
policy makers  in  the  US  and UK,  especially  the  belief that  there  was  no 382  Stefano Battilossi, James Foreman-Peck, and Gerhard  Kling 
trade-off between  inflation  and  unemployment.  Most  of western  Europe 
shared in the recession of 1980-2, but the urgent task of eradicating inflation 
left governments with little countercyclical leeway.  Especially in  most infla-
tionary countries, increasingly independent central banks carried out their task 
of"taking on inflation" with unprecedented tight money. Monetary authorities 
pushed nominal and real interest rates up to record highs untill983, often in 
the face of offsetting fiscal policies (Ciocca and Nardozzi 1996). 
Pegging weak European currencies to the DM within the EMS  proved a 
successful mechanism for disinflation. By 1985 inflation in countries with past 
records of loose money and irresponsible budgets had substantially converged 
to the German rateo  By  anchoring to the Bundesbank, European monetary 
authorities could "buy" part ofGermany's anti-inflationary reputation (Giavazzi 
and Pagano 1988). Perhaps helped by falling  oil prices from  1986 as  well, 
inflation was  gradually squeezed out of the cycle  through the  1980s.  The 
Single Market initiative was probably also a benign supply-side shock. 
N ew domes  tic equilibria emerged, based on the gradual relaxation of wage 
and pension indexation and novel relationships with trade unions that helped 
control wage dynamics. Unemployment fell when unions were either forced to 
cooperate  by legislative  changes,  as  in  the  United  Kingdom,  or  chose  to 
cooperate, as in the Dutch Wassenaar Agreement of 1982. In this Agreement, 
the unions moderated wage demands and in return management committed to 
expand part-time employrnent (Nickell and van Ours 2000). Government tax 
concessions were made for part-time employrnent and public sector employ-
ment, and wages were cut. Wage tax rates were reduced so that a lower nominal 
wage in  crease was required to maintain household in  comes. Employment grew 
and real wage  growth in the Netherlands was  similar to that in the United 
States. 
Less  successful  was  West German government policy at  the end of the 
decade, certainly turning what could have been a positive supply stimulus for 
Europe into a massive and sustained negative shock. With the breaking down of 
the Berlin Wall in 1989, the Cold War ended. The Soviet client states of  eastern 
Europe were allowed to abandon their experiment with central planning, and 
shift to markets. Had Chancellor Kohl managed economic aspects of German 
reunification with the perspicacity shown half a  century earlier by Ludwig 
Erhard, European economic history would have been transformed. 
In  July  1990  the  Germanies  were  united  monetarily  at  arate of one 
Ostmark to one Deutschmark for  two months' wages and two Ostmarks to 
one Deutschmark aboye that amount. Unfortunately the low productivity of 
the East German economy meant that this exchange rate massively overvalued 
East German labor and assets. Prices were controlled in former East Germany, 
creating  a  large  new  market  but  with  impossibly  low  productivity.  The currency conversion rate bankrupted eastern financial institutions. The burden 
of supporting a large population rendered unproductive by the terms of the 
monetary union pushed up unemployrnent. 
This negative shock was superimposed upon what seemed to be a successful 
system of pegged European exchange rates,  the EMS.  Then the 1992  crisis 
forced  the  UK  and Italy off what was  effectively  the DM peg,  but other 
economies managed to stay on it. UK exports and economic activity gene  rally 
began to expand while  those of France stagnated.  Momentum for  a  single 
currency was nevertheless maintained, and the euro was introduced for eleven 
countries on January 1, 1999. 
Business cycles in eastern Europe and  Russia, 1945-2006 
under central 
The USSR and the command economies of eastern Europe boasted that their 
economic systems were free of the periodic bursts of higher unemployrnent, 
swings in output, and price instability characteristic of the traditional western 
cycle.  According to Loshkin (1964), central planning of production and dis-
tribution, together with state ownership of all productive resources, succeeded 
in replacing "the cyclical character of  development which is organicaUy inher-
ent in capitalism" with "unswerving, continuous growth." 
With Soviet national accounting systems and state control of information, 
this claim is not easy to evaluate. Levels of  economic activity in Soviet systems 
were harder to measure than economic growth rates,  and official  data were 
censo  red. N evertheless, large fluctuations of output growth rates (but not of 
employment) seemed to be characteristic of planned eco  no  mies too, as  sug-
gested by Figure 14.5. 
This cyclical output pattern almost certainly arose because of  shocks, such 
as  harvest failure,  and because of the information and coordination chal-
lenges intrinsic to resource allocation in any large complex system. Absence 
of scarcity prices meant that there was  a very limited role for monetary or 
fiscal  policy.  Policy  was  implemented  instead  by  direct  commands  and 
controls. The changing phases of efforts to fulfill Plan targets were a signifi-
cant source of fluctuations. At the end of a Plan period pressure to attain 
planned output could accelerate production and reduce quality, or bottle-
necks in the system might require the planners to apply the brakes (Kornai 
1992, pp. 186-93). 
Besides this timing element, the system of capital grants provided without 
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Figure 14.5  Cycles Soviet-style, 1950-88. Annual growth rate of (Iog)  real  GDP Source: 
Data from Total Economy Database. 
favored expansion of business over contraction. The allocation mechanism 
was  biased towards dividing capital grants into smaller grants for various 
projects, for central planning tended to provide a similar amount to every 
project, failing to focus  on especially attractive ones and ignore those with 
poorer prospects. 
Consumption  and investment  targets  were  announced  long before  they 
were  achieved,  which  may  have  increased  the  speed  of adjustments  and 
contributed to shorter cycles compared with market economies, in addition .!]51~~¡~l:  Business cycles and economic policy, 1945-2007 
to the five-year plan planning horizon (Hutchings 1969). Kontorovich (1990) 
identified, as  the driver of cyclicality of growth rates, mistakes in the alloca-
tion of investment. These triggered imbalances and declining capital utiliza-
tion rates, which in turn caused the fluctuations. Examples of these mistakes 
were overfulfilment of plan targets in the Khruschev era of 1957-64 for heavy 
industry,  and persistent  underachievement  in  the  consumer  sector.  In  the 
following period down to 1985, that of Brezhnev and his successors, plans for 
industry  tended  to  be  les s  ambitious  and  more  scientifically  based.  But 
information  deficiencies  ensured  that  plans  continued  to  be  inconsistent 
and  therefore  subject  to  continual  revisions  during  implementation.  This 
was  a potential so urce  of output fluctuation,  but more importantly also  of 
slow productivity growth, which widened the lag behind the western econo-
mies  (Davis  1999). 
989 transition 
In  March  1985,  the  Communist  Party  elite  chose  Mikhail  Gorbachev  as 
General Secretary to  implement reforms that would correct the many prob-
lems  of the  previous  "stagnation  era,"  while  maintaining  the  communist 
system.  Gorbachev's  economic  reforms  were  unsuccessful,  with  the  conse-
quence  that  industrial  performance  and  living  standards  deteriorated. 
Economic  collapse  ignited deep-seated  ethnic and regional  grievances.  The 
ensuing political reaction exploded in a coup attempt in August 1991 and the 
subsequent  dissolution  of the  USSR  along  with  its  international  system. 
Russia's  and  eastern  Europe's  transitions  to  market  economies  brought 
them distinctive shocks that continued to ensure that their economic experi-
ences diverged from western Europe's. 
As shown in Figure 14.6, after a period of collapsing output, the transition 
economies among the central and east European countries (CEECs) began to 
catch up with the west, achieving high rates of  economic growth. However the 
former Soviet Un  ion (FSU) gene rally followed a different path, with divergent 
patterns of prices  and unemployrnent (Boeri  and Terrel 2002).  Underlying 
these paths, the shocks and their transmission processes differed for a number 
of reasons;  proximity to western Europe both geographically and culturally, 
plus the opportunity to join the EU, appear to have been critical. 
Whereas  the  "Washington  consensus"  of the  World  Bank,  the  IMF  and 
influential US  academics and policy makers, favored a "big bang" approach of 
sudden transition to markets and private enterprise, the Copenhagen criteria that 
had to be satisfied for eligibility for EU membership were more con cerned with 
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Figure 14.6  Growth  rates  in the transition. Annual  growth rate  of (Iog)  real  GOP.  CEEC  is 
weighted GOP of fifteen  CEEC  (weights are  each country's share  in total  GOP);  includes 
Albania,  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Czech Republic,  Estonia,  Hungary,  Latvia, 
Lithuania,  Macedonia,  Poland,  Romania,  Serbia,  Montenegro,  Slovakia,  Slovenia.  GOP is 
expressed in 1990 international $. Source:  data from Total Economy Oatabase. 
combined seemed tolerably effective for most of  the CEEC. "Washington" alone, 
as applied to the FSU in the 1990s, looked considerably less so. 
In  spite  of moderate  economic  growth  in  the  CEEC,  unemployrnent 
increased quickly and stayed high. Regulation and (particularly) labor market 
policies were responsible for high unemployment rates, especially minimum 
wages and unemployment benefits. Those with low skills could not find jobs 
because the wage floor was aboye what they could contribute to an employer. In 
addition,  benefits  discouraged  employment beca  use  they were  a  "negative 
subsidy"; the state took away benefits if people started working. AccordingIy, 
excessive  benefits  were  ofien blamed for  creating a  "poverty trap"  and for 
fostering the black economy, especially in eastern Germany. Rising employ-
ment from the mid-1990s in the Baltic states, which took regulatory reform 
most seriously, is consistent with this interpretation. 
Financial stability was a major concern of  the transition. After a big financial 
shock, inflation rates fell quickly in the CEECs; high convergence with German 
rates was achieved by the turn of  the century. For sorne of these economies, the 
synchronization of  their fluctuations with the Eurozone countries also increased 
(Artis, Marcellino, and Proietti 2004). EU accession (eight CEECs joined in May 
2004, and Bulgaria and Romania in 2007), fostering trade and foreign direct 
investment, contributed and also helped to enhance the quality of institutions 
(Andreff 2004). Improved institutional quality was much needed. Becoming a and economic  1945-2007 
Table 14.6  The  Russian economy during transition, 1992-9 
lndícator  Units  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1991  1998  1999 
GOPgrowth  %  -14.5  -8.7  -12.7  -4.1  -3.4  00.8: 0 
~~06  2.0 
Industrial proouction  1991=100  82  71  55  54  52  53  50  54 
lnvestmentlGOP  %  23.9  20.4  21.8  .21.3  21.2  19.4  17.6  15.3 
Unemployment  %LF  4.8  5.3  7.1  8.3  9.2  10.9  12.4  12.6 
Consumar price inflatíon  %  1526  875  311  198  48  15  28  81 
Source: Davis and Foreman-Peck 2003. 
EU member state was  not an end of the transition to  a fully fledged market 
economy. 
In  contrast in Russia,  which dominated the FSU,  the Gaidar government 
implemented a transition policy of privatization, liberalization, and free mar-
kets. They were impressed by the 1990 Polish "shock therapy" program, but the 
impad in  Russia  was  very  different.  The  policy  shocks  cut  Russian  gross 
industrial output by 40 percent in six years, as shown in Table 14.6. Most of 
this production decline was genuine rather than attributable to measurement 
error. Such a collapse of industrial output during peacetime in a major econ-
omy was unprecedented over the twentieth century. While the measurement of 
output must be subject to sorne controversy, there is no question that the most 
vital  element of welfare,  the health of the population, collapsed along with 
recorded production. 
At the same time, inflation dropped from well over 1,000 percent in 1992 
through  to  1997,  but unemployrnent  rose  in  every  year as  well.  Although 
aspects of economic performance had improved, they could not prevent the 
crash of August  1998. This was  precipitated by falling  oil prices and by the 
Asian economic crisis, but policy errors and internal weaknesses in the eco-
nomic  system  - perhaps  70  percent  of economic  activity  was  conducted 
through barter - dragged  down  the  Russian  economy.  The  equity market 
bubble burst first, the stock market index dropping from a peak of 450 to 50 
in August 1998. Unwise investments and speculative activities of most major 
Russian banks increased their vulnerability to shocks. So when in August the 
Kiriyenko government permitted the ruble exchange rate to crash and failed to 
service the government's debt (the GKOs), the banking system was paralyzed. 
Russian banks refused to honor forward exchange contracts with western banks 
and inflation jumped to over 80 percent (Davis and Foreman-Peck 2003). 
The slump of 1998-9 showed that a rapid transition in Russia on the basis 
of the Washington consensus had failed.  At the root of the problem was  a 
weak and corrupt state, which had allowed mas  s privatization and expropria-
tion of lucrative state assets  with an ineffective  legal  system.  Persistence of Conclusion 
Stefano BaHilossi, James Foreman-Peck, and Gerhard 
bureaucratic control, on the other hand, ensured the continuation of  rationing. 
Soft budget constraints for government fueled inflation, the flight from money, 
and a barter economy. All this remained to be reformed if recovery was to be 
achieved. 
A  major  contributor to  the  different  paths in  CEECs  and the  FSU  was 
political stability. In 1991 the "Russian coup," the arrest of President Mikhail 
Gorbachev,  and the breakdown of the "Emergency Committee" were  not a 
good start to the transition process. The increasing power of "oligarchs," who 
benefited from privatization under Boris Yeltsin, created substantial political 
instability. Many companies paid no taxes at all and a tax collector's life was 
very dangerous.  Insecurity was  a breeding ground for  high crime rates and 
widespread corruption, exacerbated by irregular payrnent of pensions, wages, 
and benefits, which weakened demando 
A  lower  exchange  rate,  and  a  rising  oil  price,  respectively  resto red  the 
competitiveness of Russian  industry and replenished the state  coffers  from 
1999. At the same time the authority of the central state was reasserted under 
Vladimir Putin. Yet in appointing Gref, a liberal reformer, Putin ensured that 
Russia remained committed to a market economy, and was duly rewarded by a 
long upswing of production and productivity during the eight years  of his 
presidency. 
The new millennium opened with much more of an international consensus 
about the potential and proper application of macroeconomic policy than was 
apparent at the end of the Second W orld War. Economists and policy makers 
had learned from history. Ambitions for state action were generally reduced, 
particularly for demand management with fiscal and monetary policy - or even 
with exchange rate regimes. "Stability" remained the watchword. 
On the one hand, the supremacy of markets over state plans for delivering 
goods  and services  was  established.  On the other,  periodic  unemployment 
associated with business cycles,  as  well  as  structural unemployrnent, had not 
gone away in western Europe and had returned in the east.  Shocks had not 
disappeared; the "sub-prime" financial crisis beginning in July 2007, linked to 
oil and other commodity price hikes, indicated that the recession of  2008-9 was 
likely to  be  especially severe  and widespread.  Financial innovation without 
appropriate regulation had created sorne very vulnerable structures, raising risk 
perceptions and interest rates. 
The market fundamentalism of the Washington consensus had proved 
to be inadequate in Russia without the appropriate supporting institutions. Business cycles and economic pOlicy, 1945-2007 
Fiscal  policy  had  proved  too  rigid  an  instrument  for  general  demand 
management. Monetary policy was more flexible and therefore more appro-
priate in normal times for smoothing the business cyele.  In this respect the 
new poliey orthodoxy resembled that under the late nineteenth-century gold 
standard, without the link between money and gold. In addition, confidence 
abounded that another Great Depression could be avoided by prompt action 
on the part of the monetary authorities to prevent collapses of  large financial 
institutions. 
Keynesian economie management was not responsible for the rapid growth 
of "the golden age."  Nor were monetarism, independent central banks, and 
replacement  of policy  discretion  by rules  entirely to  be  credited  with  the 
stability of the Great Moderation of the 1990s.  But much of the volatility of 
the 1970s and 1980s could be attributed to policy extravagances. 